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I study the slow adoption of ring spinning in Great Britains cotton industry at the end of
the 19th century, which has been used as evidence of British entrepreneursdeclining e¢ ciency
and conservatism (Musson [1959], Aldcroft, [1964], Lazonick [1981, 1981b]). To this purpose I
use rm-level data from all of Lancashires cotton rms over several years. The data are from
Worralls The Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers Directory for the years 1885, 1886-1887,
1890, 1894, 1902, and 1910.
First, I show that the vertical organization of the industry, with its rms specializing in spin-
ning or weaving, did not act as an impediment to the adoption of the ring spinning technology,
as was argued by Lazonick. In particular, I show the following: i) non-integrated rms were
the rst to adopt rings in Great Britain; ii) the large majority of rms that adopted rings were
incumbents; iii) vertically integrated rms that were spinning only either twist or weft yarn were
still in existence in 1910; and iv) only a negligible number of rms changed their organizational
structure upon adopting ring spinning. I also show that a large fraction of rms installed very
small numbers of ring spindles upon the adoption of ring spinning, suggesting that rms were
slowly adopting ring spindles to replace old mule spindles rather than transitioning over to ring
spinning at a single point in time.
Then, I show that the rate at which vertically integrated rms adopted rings suddenly accel-
erated after 1902. I interpret this as evidence that British entrepreneurs were fully aware of the
technological complementarities between rings and automatic looms. These complementarities
could only be fully exploited by vertically integrated rms.
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1 Introduction
For decades, historians have been concerned with explaining the decline of Great Britain as the
economic world leader after 1870. By the end of the 1890s, Britain had lost the industrial leadership
of the world to Germany and the United States (McCloskey and Sandberg [1971]). In an inuential
paper, Aldcroft [1964] argued that Britains poor economic performance can be attributed largely
to the failure of the British entrepreneur to respond to the challenge of changed condition. [...]
The failure to adopt new techniques, that is new machinery and other cost-reducing innovations
[...] was one of the chief reasons [...] for the decline in the rate of growth of the British economy.1
This paper investigates whether the decline of Great Britain can be explained, at least in part,
by the ineptitude of its entrepreneurs, as was argued by Aldcroft. To address this question, I look
at one industrial case that has been at the center of a highly charged and often heated exchange
spread out over a number of rounds and spanning several decades: the slow adoption by the British
entrepreneurs of ring spinning in yarn production. The main reason why the adoption of ring
spinning has received so much attention is because the cotton industry was the most important
export industry in Britain throughout the 19th century.
Since the mid 1880s, the new technique of ring spinning had become economically viable in
yarn production.2 The production of yarn was faster with ring spinning than with mule spinning.
Further, labor costs were lower. Ring spinning was more e¢ cient than mule spinning: per unit of
time, ring spinning resulted in higher production at a lower labor cost. If British entrepreneurs had
1Aldcroft [1964], p. 113 and p. 115. For a critical analysis of the full damning catalogue of reasons for the
British entrepeneurs failure, see McCloskey and Sandberg [1971].
2Leunig [1996, 2001] provides a review of the cotton manufacturing process and of the di¤erences between ring
and mule spinning. He also provides a comprehensive review of the literature. Here, I present the key insights of the
debate on the adoption of rings in Great Britain at the end of the 19th century.
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been prot maximizers, the indictment reads, they should have started adopting ring spinning as
soon as the early 1880s, when it became economically viable. Until 1910, however, mule spinning
continued to be heavily preferred to ring spinning. For this reason, the slow adoption of ring
spinning has been used as evidence of British entrepreneursdeclining e¢ ciency and conservatism
(Musson [1959]).
Sandberg [1969] challenged the interpretation of the slow adoption of ring spinning as evidence
of the ineptitude of the British entrepreneurs. He calculated the cost and benets of mule versus
ring spinning, and concluded that the choice of production technique was rational. Lancashire
cotton rms were adopting rings for the production of the coarser types of cotton yarn for which
the ring was superior to the mule.
Lazonick [1981, 1981b] revived the hypothesis that Lancashire cotton rms were managed by
inept entrepreneurs. Lazonick conrmed Sandbergs conclusions that Lancashire businessmen
performed admirably as neoclassical managers, but he also advanced the hypothesis that they
failed as entrepreneurs.3 Lazonick showed that entrepreneurial failure was systematic across the
cotton industry, and did not involve only scattered cases of entrepreneurial success or failure.4
The central tenet of Lazonicks argument was the following. In the last quarter of the 19th century,
most of the Lancashire cotton rms were either spinning cotton or weaving yarn. Some vertically
integrated rms were both spinning and weaving on the same site. Lazonick argued that the cost
of shipping ring yarn was signicantly higher for non-integrated rms than it was for integrated
rms, while the di¤erence was inconsequential for mule yarn. Rings spun the yarn on a heavy
3Lazonick [1981b], p. 37.
4McCloskey and Sandberg [1971], p. 99.
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wooden bobbin that needed to be rewound, while mules spun yarn on small and light packages
ready to be woven. For some types of yarn, the di¤erence in the transportation costs was so large
that a non-integrated rm would have never found it protable to adopt ring spinning. Lancashire
businessmen should then have vertically integrated but did not, failing to recognize that managers
from time to time (as innovating entrepreneurs), overcome givenconstraints and on a more regular
basis (as supervisors of the enterprise) alter givenconstraints.5 The constraint that Lancashire
cotton rms did not overcome was the vertical organization of cotton production.6
Saxonhouse and Wright [1984] challenged Lazonicks claim that it was because of the vertical
organization of the industry that the Lancashire cotton rms did not adopt rings. First, they used
data from the records of British textile machinery companies to show that the Lancashire cotton
rms did not adopt an innovation (paper-tubes) that would have reduced the transportation costs
associated with ring spinning.7 They inferred that transportation costs had to be lower than
the amount that Lazonick computed, because otherwise the British rms would have adopted the
innovation.8 Second, they used the same records of British textile machinery companies to develop
5Lazonick [1981], p. 90.
6See Lazonick, pp. 396-397 [1984, pp. 396-397] for more on this. Temin [1988, page 906] has argued that the ease
of access to capital made the formation of integrated concerns easier in North America. Following Temins argument,
this is equivalent to saying that if in Lancashire there had been easy access to capital, cotton rms would have chosen
vertical integration over specialization. However, information at the rm-level shows that many rms were sharing
power, plants, and possibly power-looms. As Gatrell [1977, page 105] wrote, credit was available to all producers
in the 1820s and 1830s: by 1835, it was claimed that mostnew rms were being set up on borrowings of up to
two-thirds of the value of buildings and machinery combined.
7Saxonhouse and Wright use the data from the records of British textile machinery companies to also conrm
one of Lazonicks nding, which is that British cotton spinners maintained their commitment to the mule in new
installations until World War I.
8 In his reply to Saxonhouse and Wright, Lazonick [1987] made a useful distinction between twist and weft yarn,
which Saxonhouse and Wright essentially accepted: paper tubes would have ensured lower transportation costs only
for twist (warp) yarn, not for weft yarn. Thus, Saxonhouse and Wrights main point remained valid as far as warp yarn
was concerned: Lancashire cotton rms did not adopt it to as great an extent as they should have if transportation
costs were as important as Lazonick had claimed in his previous work.
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a cross-country comparison between Britain, New England, and Japan.9 On one hand, they pointed
out that New England had a vertically integrated cotton industry but never attained international
competitiveness.10 On the other hand, they highlighted the case of the Japanese cotton industry,
which rapidly captured the world markets in the 1920s and 1930s while switching from mules to
rings, but never wove more than 30 percent of its yarn on a vertically integrated basis.11 Using
this stark contrast between the British, Japanese and New England experiences, Saxonhouse and
Wright concluded that vertical specialization was not, per se, an obstacle to ring adoption.
In recent work, Leunig [1996, 2001] further investigated the di¤erences in transportation costs
associated with ring and mule spinning. Leunig broke down the distribution of spinners and weavers
in Lancashire and assessed how much yarn was spun and woven in each district. He constructed
proxies for yarn output and weaving capacity, and identied those districts where weaving capacity
exceeded total spinning output. He called these the co-locateddistricts. All spinners in a co-
locateddistrict could have sold all of their yarn to weavers within their districts. The critical point
made by Leunig is that non-integrated rms in co-locateddistricts could escape the problem of
9Saxonhouse and Wright [2009] further investigate the evolution of ring spinning at global, national and rm
levels, and track adoption decisions in a large number of countries over a span of more than fty years. The result of
their investigation is a case study in global competition between contending technological paradigms.
10See Leunig [2003] for an analysis of productivity in the Lancashire and New England cotton spinning industries
at the beginning of the 20th century.
11 In a paper co-written with Mass (Mass and Lazonick [1990]), Lazonick addressed this second point made by
Saxonhouse and Wright. Lazonick and Mass claimed that the explanation of Japans success was in its planned
co-ordination,which dominated the market co-ordinationof the Lancashire industry. That is, spinning-only rms
as well as merchants (or trading companies) co-ordinated the vertical structure of the industry so that even though
they never wove more than 30 percent of its yarn (mostly for the export trade) on a vertically integrated basis, it still
acted as if it was fully vertically integrated. The crucial question here is, how do we measure the extent of vertical
co-ordination? More specically, how can we determine in some quantiable fashion whether the Japanese cotton
industry was more vertically co-ordinated than the British one? In contrast to the original article by Lazonick
[1984], Mass and Lazonick [1990] does not provide a sharp and denitive testable hypothesis, just an interesting
perspective on the di¤erences between the Japanese and the British cotton industries at the beginning of the 20th
century. For more on this, and for a more detailed discussion of the role of merchants as co-ordinating agents in the
Lancashire cotton industry, see Broadberry and Marrison [2002] and Farnie [2004].
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transport costs. Hence, by contrasting the ring adoption patterns of integrated and non-integrated
rms in co-located districts, Leunig tested whether the vertical organization of a rm acted as a
constraint in the adoption of rings. He found that rings were the clear majority choice for both
vertically integrated and co-located rms, whereas mules were the clear majority choice for vertically
isolated rms. Leunig also concluded that vertical specialization was not per se an obstacle to ring
adoption.
A fundamental unifying feature of the works by Sandberg, Lazonick, Saxonhouse and Wright,
and Leunig is that they all use aggregate data to investigate what is fundamentally a rm-level issue,
the adoption of ring spinning. To be able to infer something about rm behavior from aggregate
data, these authors used very clever arguments. Here, I take a di¤erent approach. Instead of relying
on some very sophisticated deductive arguments, I let the data speak.
The main contribution of this paper is to use rm-level data from the entire population of Lan-
cashire cotton rms over several years to investigate the organizational and technological choices
of the cotton rms in that county. The data are from Worralls The Cotton Spinners and Man-
ufacturersDirectory for 1885, 1887, 1890, 1894, 1902, and 1910.12 In practice, I collected and
organized data for thousands of rms, and classied them as spinner-only, weaver-only, or vertically
integrated rms. This makes it possible to directly test arguments that Lazonick used to claim that
British entrepreneurs failed as entrepreneurs. I also match information from Worralls The Cotton
Spinners and ManufacturersDirectories with maps of Preston and Blackburn extracted from the
12Lazonick [1981] used the same data source for 1907 and 1910, but mainly at an aggregate level. The only rm-level
information that Lazonick uses from Worralls Directory concerns the 2100 ring spindles in all of Lancashire that
spun weft in a non-integrated mill (Lazonick [1981], p. 98). Leunig [1996, 2001] uses data from Worralls Directory
in 1905 to argue that the adoption rates of rings to spin weft yarn did not di¤er between vertically integrated and
non-integrated rms.
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Ordnance Survey, 1891-92. This allows me to check Leunigs theory of co-location using rm-level
data.
First, I show that the vertical organization of the industry, with its rms specializing in spinning
or weaving, did not act as an impediment to the adoption of the ring spinning technology, as was
argued by Lazonick. In particular, I show the following: i) non-integrated rms were the rst to
adopt rings in Great Britain; ii) the large majority of rms that adopted rings were incumbents; iii)
vertically integrated rms that were spinning only either twist or weft yarn were still in existence
in 1910; and iv) only a negligible number of rms changed their organizational structure upon
adopting ring spinning. I also show that a large proportion of rms installed very small numbers
of ring spindles upon the adoption of ring spinning, suggesting that rms were slowly adopting
ring spindles to replace old mule spindles rather than transitioning over to ring spinning at a single
point in time.
Then, I show that the rate at which vertically integrated rms adopted rings suddenly accel-
erated after 1902. This is a novel and striking nding that had not been uncovered until now. I
interpret this nding as evidence that British entrepreneurs were fully aware of the technological
complementarities between rings and automatic looms. These complementarities could only be
fully exploited by vertically integrated rms.
The paper is organized as follows. I provide a description of the cotton manufacturing process
in Section (2). The new dataset is briey described in Section (3). Section (4) investigates how the
deductive arguments used by Sandberg, Lazonick, Saxonhouse and Wright, and Leunig fare when
rm-level data is used. Section (5) proposes an explanation for why vertically integrated rms
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started adopting rings only after 1902. Section (6) concludes.
2 A Brief Introduction to the Production of Cotton
Cotton Spinning and Weaving. The production of cotton can be summarized in four successive
steps: cleaning the raw cotton;13 spinning, or transforming the cleaned raw cotton into yarn;
weavingthe yarn into cotton cloth; and the nishing operations, such as bleaching, dyeing
and printing. In this paper I focus on the spinning and weaving processes.14 The basic function
of the spinning process is to bind the laments together into one strand by means of twisting it, and
ensure that the resulting yarn resists the strain which it will have to undergo when woven. After
being twisted, the yarn is wound into a package to be shipped to weavers. These two sub-processes,
twisting and winding, can either be done continuously (using rings) or intermittently (using mules).
Weaving consists of combining two sets of threads, one of which is immobile (the warp or twist),
and the other which moves normally to the rst and lls it (the weft).15
Technological Progress. There are three technological periods for weaving. First, between 1800
and 1830, the hand-loom was used to produce all cloths. Often, spinning was done in factories,
while weaving was either outsourced to households, or done in sheds attached to the factory. By
13Cleaning consists of loosening the mass of bers in its original state of the raw cotton into a clean set of
individual bers parallel to each other. This is done by passing the raw cotton through rollers, and this operation
is called carding. If the cotton is of a ne quality, an additional operation, called combing, is performed on
it, to remove bers that are too short and ensure a parallel position for the remaining ones. Finally, the bers are
combined (drawing and roving) and attenuated so that the resulting laments are uniform in thickness before
going through the subsequent spinning process.
14During the cleaning process some of the cotton is wasted. Some of this waste is lost, but some is recovered through
the condenser system. Because the nal product which is obtained from the condenser system is specialized and
di¤erent from the product obtained from the standard processes of spinning and weaving, it is not considered here.
See Robson [1957] for more on this.
15The result of spinning was either warp or weft yarn. The rst had to be stronger than the second, since it would
serve as the frame of the cloth, while the weft would be used to ll the twist to form the cloth. Weft would use cotton
that is 7 percent shorter than that needed for ring warp (Leunig [1996]).
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1830, the power-loom was perfected and could be used to weave coarse and medium cloth. Cloths
that used yarn of counts of up to 60 could be woven in 1841 with power-looms. Between 1850 and
the 1880s, the power-loom was extended to the production of ne cloth. In 1894 the automatic
loom was invented in the US, but it was adopted very slowly in Britain.
There are two technological periods in spinning. The rst period goes from 1820 until the early
1880s. In these years, the self-acting mule was used by all spinners. Then in the early 1880s, the
ring frame was perfected for spinning coarse and medium cloths and was slowly adopted by British
entrepreneurs.
Fineness. Cotton yarn is normally classied as coarse, medium, or ne. The unit of measures
of neness is the hank. A hank of cotton yarn or twist always measure 840 yards. If the count
of 1 is reported, this means that one hank of cotton yarn weighs one pound. If the count of 40
is reported, this means that forty hanks of cotton weigh one pound.16 The more hanks that are
needed to make one pound, the ner the yarn is. Thus, a count of 120 means that the yarn is very
ne, a count of 40 means that the yarn is of medium neness, and a count of 2 means that the yarn
is very coarse.
Ring versus Mule Spinning. Ring spinning subjected cotton to more strain: for any given
count, mule spinning could use raw cotton of lesser quality relative to what ring spinning could
use. Ring spinning required a longer cotton staple and, since the price of cotton increased with
length, the raw input was potentially more costly under ring spinning. Leunig calculates the cost
di¤erentials of raw cotton between ring and mule spinning.17 He shows convincingly that the
16Ure [1831], Appendix A, page 335.
17Leunig [1996], p. 66. Leunigs ndings do not support Lazonicks, [1981. p. 103] assumption on the cost
di¤erentials between mules and rings.
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premium started slightly in the range of counts 20 to 30 and increased with count spun.18
Rings required unskilled or semiskilled female labor, while mule spinning used highly skilled
male labor. Further, ring spinning was faster. In the same amount of time, one ring spindle could
produce 1:45 times more than one mule spindle.19 Sandberg, Lazonick and Leunig concluded that,
as far as labor costs were concerned, ring spinning was cheaper than mule spinning for all counts.
Leunig showed that labor cost savings increased in the count spun.20
Mule weft yarn was wound into packages that were lighter than the wooden bobbin needed for
ring weft yarn. Sandberg showed that ring spinning increased the transportation costs of weft yarn
by 200 percent. Lazonick showed that it cost as much to return bobbins as to send them, and that
there was always the possibility that some or all of the bobbins would be lost or broken. The extra
cost per pound of shipping ring weft would then rise by 500 percent. Transportation costs for twist
yarn varied much less: Leunig nds the transport cost of shipping ring twist yarn to be larger by
a value between 24 percent and 100 percent.21
Vertical Organization of the Industry. There were four types of rms in the industry. Each
type of rm could own more than one plant.
The rst two types were rms that specialized in either spinning or weaving. For example, the
rm Bolling owned four plants in Bolton in 1833, and the four of them were dedicated only to
spinning. These were vertically specialized rms, or spinning-only or weaving-only rms.
Then there were rms that were vertically integrated in a strict sense: they were spinning and
18Normally weft yarn is of higher count than twist yarn. For example shirtings were produced with twist counts in
the 20s and weft counts in the 30s (Cotton Manufactures, Report of the Tari¤ Board on Schedule I of the Tari¤ Law,
House of Representatives, Washington, 1912).
19Leunig [2001].
20Leunig [1996], p. 66.
21Leunig [2001].
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weaving in the same building. For example, in 1833 the rm Birley and Kirk owned a rm in
Manchester where 931 spinners and 471 weavers worked. These were vertically integrated rms.
Finally, there were rms that were vertically integrated in a loose sense: they were both spinning
and weaving but in two di¤erent plants. For example, the rm Hadeld and Frost owned two plants
in Warrington in 1833: one plant had 143 spinners while the other plant had 192 weavers. These
were vertically combined rms.22
There is a rich literature on the advantages and disadvantages of specialization in the produc-
tion of cotton. On one hand, Farnie [1979, page 319] has argued that by compartmentalizing
technical knowledge, vertical specialization accentuated the vertical ignorance of both spinners
and manufacturers, [...] it insulated spinners from the ultimate market for woven goods, hindered
them from producing the yarns best suited to specic types of cloth.Similarly, using data from the
1841 Inspector Horners Factory Reports, Gatrell [1977] argues that if there were advantages for
the rms that were spinning and weaving, then these advantages were not derived from their larger
size in and of itself, but from internal economies in the costs otherwise incurred in selling, buying,
and transporting yarns.On the other hand, Jewkes [1930, page 96] argued that specialization gave
rms the ability to adapt to the changing conditions of the market and the scale of production:
[...] the multiplicity of nished products and the di¤erent technique demanded for maximum ef-
ciency in spinning and weaving rms [forced] the separation in the ownership and control of the
two processes. Also, Huberman [1990] has argued that after 1850, new rms tended to specialize
in spinning or weaving because large integrated rms faced a managerial constraint [because they
22The distinction between vertically integrated and combined rms is particularly interesting: it should provide in-
formation on whether the di¤erences between vertically specialized rms and those that were not vertically specialized
were at the plant or the rm level. I shall return to this in Section (4.1).
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were] unable to monitor and supervise their work forces e¤ectively.23 Saxonhouse and Wright
[1984, page 518] also claimed that the newer rms and mills were specialized and, in conjunction
with highly developed markets and marketing facilities, [...] were able to exploit distinct managerial
talents and abilities as well as economies of long production runs for standard counts of yarn. In
this paper, I stay away from determining which of those advantages and disadvantages dominated,
and I look only at the ring adoption behavior of the two organizational forms.
3 Data
The data are from Worralls The Cotton Spinners and ManufacturersDirectory of 1885, 1886-7,
1890, 1893-4, 1902 and 1910. These data contain information on the names of the rms, locations,
and types of spindle used by cotton rms in Lancashire. They also contain information on the
number of spindles (and looms) used by each rm, the neness of the product manufactured and
whether the rm spun both twist and weft yarn.
An important step in the coding of the data consists of determining the neness of cloth. To this
end, I have followed two approaches, compared their results, and then checked their consistency
against each other. First I have used the Cotton Manufactures, Report of the Tari¤ Board on
Schedule I of the Tari¤ Law, House of Representatives, Washington, 1912. The report presents a
section that associates the range of counts for yarn to the type of cloth produced: for example,
Heavy Sheetingis produced with twist yarn of count 12, and with weft yarn of count 16. Another
example is Shirting, which is produced with twist yarn of count 28 and weft yarn of count in
the 30s. This classication does not cover all the types of cloths. When a type of cloth is not
23Huberman [1990], page 683.
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included, I look for a rm that also produces another type of cloth that is in the book and infer
the classication for the one that is not in the book. Then I used the information from Worralls
Directories. I reasonably assumed that rms producing both yarn and cloth will choose a range
of counts for yarn that can be used by their weavers to produce cloth. I have done a consistency
check between the two methods and the results are perfectly consistent. The results are presented
in Table 1.24
Table 2 provides the summary statistics for the cotton rms in Lancashire in 1890. The rst
row gives the percentage of industry output by rm type in 1890. Spinner-only rms owned 64:4
percent of the total spindleage in 1890.25 In 1902, the spinner-only rms controlled 71:0 percent of
the spindle capacity. By 1910, they controlled 78:8 percent. Notice that this number is the same
as the one reported by Lazonick.26 Thus, spinner-only rms increased their spinning capacity over
time.
The last rows of Table 2 show that the number of spinner-only rms increased between 1890
and 1910, while the number of vertically integrated rms declined.
Just by looking at Table 2, it is already di¢ cult to reconcile the dramatic increase in the number
of spinner-only rms, and in their capacity of spindles, with the idea that vertical integration was
24 In practice, to classify the product I have proceeded as follows. I have identied ve classications: very coarse
(1), coarse/medium (12), medium (2), medium/ne (23), ne (3). If a rm reports that it spins yarn of
count between 0 and 20, then the rm is assigned a 1. If the rm reports a twist count between 20 and 40, then
the rm is assigned a 2. If the rms reports a twist count above 40, then I assign the rm a 3. I include the
upper extreme in the lower interval. For example, a count of 40 corresponds to 2. I then apply the classication
to weft yarn, and assign a 1 for 0-30, a 2 for 30-50 and a 3 for counts above 50. In some cases there may be
uncertainty because weft and twist are in di¤erent sections. When this occurs, I follow a conservative approach, and
use the twist. Often rms produce counts that are between regions. For example, they may choose to produce yarn
of count 10/30. In this case I assign the rm a count equal to 12. If a rm has very few spindles or few looms,
then I take a conservative approach, and if the rm gives a very large range of counts (say 10/30), then I assign it in
the lower region (1).
25My numbers are unadjusted for di¤erences in speed between rings and mules.
26Lazonick, [1984] p. 394.
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the most e¢ cient way to manufacture cotton. It would have taken a truly impressive degree of
ineptitude on the part of the British entrepreneurs to justify these patterns in the data.
4 Did British Entrepreneurs Fail?
In this Section, I rst provide new evidence on the importance of transportation costs in the cotton
industry. Then I check, one by one, all of the deductive arguments used by Lazonick, and see if
there are fallacies in them that can be uncovered by the rm-level data.
4.1 Transportation Costs
As discussed in the introduction, the crucial insight of Lazonicks analysis is that the transportation
costs of shipping ring yarn were signicantly larger than those of shipping mule yarn, and thus
British entrepreneurs should have vertically integrated in order to escape the higher transportation
costs of shipping ring yarn. Table 3 shows the conclusions that can be drawn from the new
calculations made by Leunig for labor and raw cotton costs, and the calculations made by Lazonick
for transportation costs. The rst row shows that vertically integrated rms, which could escape
transportation costs, should have chosen rings to produce weft and twist yarn of counts lower than
40. The second row shows that non-integrated rms should have chosen rings to produce twist yarn
of counts lower than 40, but should never have chosen rings to produce weft yarn.
The best place to begin the empirical analysis is to look more carefully at some evidence on
the actual magnitude of transportation costs. In abstract, the transportation costs could be quite
large, as Sandberg, Lazonick, and Leunig showed in their detailed analysis. The relevant issue
here is whether, in practice, the costs were actually as large. As Leunig observed, if rms were
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geographically close to each other then, in practice, transportation costs would be negligible. Using
aggregate data, Leunig identied co-located districts, where weaving capacity exceeded total
spinning output. Here, I take another step in this direction.
Evidence from the Ordnance Survey. I match the information from Worralls The Cotton
Spinners and ManufacturersDirectory of 1890 with historical maps published as part of the Ord-
nance Survey conducted in 1891 and 1892 in Great Britain. I look at the distribution of cotton
mills in the centre of two towns, Blackburn and Preston. For both of them I identify whether a
cotton mill corresponds to a weaver, a spinner, or an integrated rm. Then, I identify whether the
spinners or the vertically integrated rms produce both weft and twist yarn, or just one of the two.
Figure 1 looks at the case of Blackburn. We observe that rms were locating their plants (mills)
close to each other and to the canal. Eanam Bridge Mill was a spinning rm, producing only weft
yarns. In the adjacent building, Rose Hill Mill was an integrated rm and produced both twist and
weft yarn. In the building in front, the Wharf Street Mill housed a weaver. Clearly, spinning and
weaving plants were located very closely together, suggesting that the transportation costs would
have been negligible.
Figure 2 shows that Blackburn was not an exception. We can count as many as ten mills in the
centre of Preston. The survey shows that in Preston the vertically integrated rm John Goodair
& Co. owned the Brookeld Mill and the Peel Mill. John Goodair & Co. spun only weft yarn.
In the building in front of the Brookeld Mill (which occupied two buildings) was the Southgate
Mill, owned by the vertically integrated rm Joseph Smith. Joseph Smith spun both twist and
weft yarn. Within a short distance, there were four weavers-only, one spinner-only and another
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vertically integrated rm. Nothing in the data indicates whether these nine rms were in a business
relationship, but vertically integrated rms were located in a district with several rms that were
all closely located. Notice that the Peel Mill was not located in the proximity of the Brookeld
Mill.
Both Figures 1 and 2 tell the same tale. Firms of all types (spinners, weavers, and vertically
integrated) were all located near each other. Ideally, one could construct maps for all districts and
all rms, and could even compute the distances between mills as a measure of transportation costs.
Yet the main nding would remain the same: while transportation costs were potentially large, in
practice they were most likely negligible.
Firms and Plants. Another approach to show that transportation costs had to be negligible con-
sists of looking for counter-examples. I look for vertically integrated rms that do not manufacture
both weft and twist in-house. This would provide evidence that even vertically integrated rms
were willing to pay the transportation costs. The driving idea is to use the distinction between
plant and rm. This distinction is important here because rms often shared the same plant (here
meant as a physical bulding), or one rm controlled more than one plant.27
The new rm-level data clarify that rms that both wove and spun might very well have been
engaging in those two activities at di¤erent plants. For example, in 1890 the rm Taylor located
in Blackburn owned 111; 800 spindles and 2; 152 looms. The rm distributed its production among
six mills. Figure 1 shows that at least one of them, the Bridge Water Mill, was not close to any
of the other ve mills owned by the rm. The closest mills to the Bridge Water Mill were owned
27See Mokyr [2001] for a discussion on the distinction between rms and mills and for a more general analysis of
the rise and fall of the factory system.
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by two weaver-only rms. Thus, we know that the Bridge Water Mill was owned by a vertically
integrated rm, but we do not know whether the Bridge Water Mill both spun and wove or did
only one of the two.28
In only a few exceptions is information available on how rms distributed their productions across
plants. These exceptions can be used as a counter-example to Lazonicks claim that entrepreneurs
should have vertically integrated in order to escape the higher transportation costs of shipping
ring yarn. In the 1902 edition of Worralls The Cotton Spinners and ManufacturersDirectory,
the rm Halliday & Constantine owned the Dicconson Mill at Wigan where it only spun (using
ring spindles) and the Upper Mills in Golborne, where it only wove. This rm was denitively not
vertically integrated. Another counter-example was given by the rm Hadeld and Frost, which
owned two plants in Warrington in 1833: one plant had 143 spinners while the other plant had
192 weavers. One could also construct numerous counter-examples by showing the large degree of
heterogeneity in the ratio of spindles to looms at vertically integrated rms, which suggests that
these rms did outsource some of the weaving or spinning to specialized rms.29
It is inappropriate to generalize from a few rms to the entire industry, but it is clear that the
unit of observation should be the plant (mill) rather than the rm. If the distinction between plants
and rms is introduced, then even what Lazonick classied as vertically integrated rms could have
28The Worralls Directory rarely provides information on how the total spinning and weaving capacity is divided
among the mills of one rm.
29 In 1890 the average ratio across all the vertically integrated rms was 55.9 spindles per loom; the standard
deviation was equal to 42.2, the maximum was 408.9; and the mimimum was equal to 2.2. One might argue that
the heterogeneity in the type of cloth being produced would lead to heterogeneity in this ratio. In particular, if you
are producing coarse cloth you need far fewer spindles per loom than if you are producing ne yarn. To check this
possibility, I recomputed the average number of spindles per loom only for the producers of ner goods. I found
the average ratio to be equal to 58.1 and the standard deviation equal to 52.0. Thus, heterogeneity in the ratio of
spindles to looms is not driven by the neness of the cloth produced.
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spun and woven at di¤erent plants, facing the same transportation costs as the specialized rms.
4.2 The Adoption of Ring Spinning over Time and Across Types of Firms
Table 4.a lists the rms that reported the use of ring spinning in 1887, 1890 and 1894.30 I also use
data from 1885 and 1887 to show whether rms changed their vertical structure by the time they
had adopted ring spinning in 1887. The rms reported in Table 4.a are the early adopters of rings
in the Lancashire cotton industry. The table reports whether the rm was a spinner-only (S), a
weaver-only (W ) or vertically integrated (V I). I also report the name of the rm (abbreviated), the
district where the rm was located, and the number of ring spindles that were owned by the rm
in each of those ve years. The rm might also report mule spindles but for the sake of simplicity
they are not reported in the table. If the rm reports the number of spindles but does not say
how many of them are rings and how many are mules, then the number of spindles is reported in
brackets. Table 4.b lists the rms that reported the use of ring spinning in 1902, and is organized
in the same fashion as Table 4.a. Table 4.c lists the rms that reported the use of ring spinning
in 1910, but, for sake of brevity, does not report the number of ring spindles that they owned.31
Column 1 of Table 5 shows the total cumulative number of rms that adopted rings over
time. In 1887, only 9 rms reported that they had adopted ring spinning, and 3 of these were
newly formed rms relative to 1885. Of the other 6 rms, we know that the rm Bury Cotton
Spinning and Manufacturing Co. (located in the district of Bury) had been in the industry since
1840; Heywood Cotton Spinning and Manufacturing Co. (in Heywood) since 1860;32 New Lady
30See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion on the collection of the data used in Tables 4a, 4b, 4c.
31This information is available from the author. It is used to construct Figure 3.
32Notwitshanding its name (manufacturing usually means that the rm also weaves its yarn), this rm was a
spinner-only in all of Worralls Directories that I used. My guess is that this rm had originally been vertically
integrated and then did not change its name when it discontinued its weaving operations.
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House Cotton Spinning Co. (in Rochdale) since 1877. Seven of these nine rms were still in
business in 1910, suggesting that they thrived after the adoption of ring spinning.
Twenty-ve rms had adopted rings by 1890. This was still a small number relative to the total
of almost 1,000 rms that were spinning yarn in Lancashire. Fifty-eight rms had adopted rings
by 1894. By 1902, the number of rms that had adopted rings was already 109, around 10 percent
of the total number of rms in the industry. Three hundred and thirth rms, or approximately
one third of the spinning rms in Lancashire, had adopted rings by 1910. Some remarkable ones,
which adopted rings more than twenty years after this technology rst became available, are the
vertically integrated rm Bury & Heap Commercial Co. (located in the Bury district), which had
been in the industry since 1859, and the vertically integrated rm Ashton (in Hyde), which had
been in the industry since 1780. These were presumably very well managed vertically integrated
rms and yet they did not adopt rings as soon as they could have done.
Finally, Tables 4.a, 4.b, and 4.c show that the districts of Manchester, Oldham, and Rochdale
contained the largest number of rms that had adopted rings by 1902. By 1910, most of the districts
had rms that had adopted rings.
We can now check whether the rst of Lazonicks deductive arguments withstands the test of the
new rm-level data. Lazonick claimed that British entrepreneurs should have vertically integrated
in order to escape the higher transportation costs of shipping ring yarn. One of his arguments
was that ring spindles were installed disproportionately in integrated mills, 46 percent of all ring
spindles being in these mills in 1913.33 That is, Britain would have adopted rings much more
quickly if more rms had been vertically integrated.
33Lazonick [1981], page 98.
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Column 2 of Table 5 reports the number of spinners-only that had adopted rings. By 1887,
eight out of nine rms reporting ring spindles were non-integrated. By 1890, 23 out of 25 were
non-integrated. By 1902, only around 20 percent of the adopters were vertically integrated rms.
One novel and striking nding is that during the period between 1902 and 1910 vertically
integrated rms started adopting ring spinning in a systematic fashion. Of the 221 rms that
adopted rings between 1902 and 1910, 50 percent were vertically integrated. In 1910 the vertically
integrated rms controlled 40 percent of the ring spindles in Lancashire, which is a gure very close
to the 46 percent found by Lazonick for 1913. Thus, Lazonick did not get the numbers wrong for
1913. What he got wrong was the projection back in time for the earlier years when, contrary to
his conclusions, the non-integrated rms were the rst to adopt rings. Only after 1902, during the
last period of expansion of the Lancashire cotton industry, did vertically integrated rms start to
adopt ring spinning. If integration had anything to do with failure, it would have been seen in the
data since the very beginning. It did not.
The second of Lazonicks arguments was that the British continued to use new mules to replace
retired mules, rather than adopting rings. To support this conjecture, Lazonick claimed that a
large proportion of the increase in ring spindles consisted of ring-frames installed in new mills or
extensions of old mills, and hence did not replace retired mules.34
Column 3 of Table 5 shows that until 1902 almost all of the rms that adopted rings were
incumbents in the industry. Most of these rms, already in the industry, were adopting rings to
replace old mules or to expand their production. After 1902, many new rms adopted rings as well.
This is understandable: the rst decade of the twentieth century was a period of great expansion
34Lazonick [1981], page 96.
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for the Lancashire cotton industry, and it is natural that new entrants would also adopt rings.
However, the key observation here is that by far the greatest number of rms that adopted rings
by 1910 were incumbents. The type of entrepreneurial failure imagined by Lazonick would have
shown up in the data as new entrants adopting faster than the incumbents.35 They did not. Only
24 percent of the rms that had adopted rings by 1910 were new rms.
Column 4 of Table 5 reinforces this observation by showing that most of the new rms were
spinner-only rms. This observation is particularly striking when coupled with another one, which
is underscored in Column 5 of Table 5: almost no rm changed its organizational form (e.g. from
being a spinner-only to being a vertically integrated rm or vice versa) upon the adoption of ring
spinning. Moreover, we can use the information in Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c to show that out of the
seven rms that changed organizational form, only Rostron in Rochdale and Hindle in Blackburn
vertically integrated their weaving and spinning upon the adoption of ring spinning. The other ve
vertically de-integrated their operations.
Finally, we can use Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c to look at the number of ring spindles installed in
order to learn about the distribution of the number of ring spindles installed. The idea here is the
following: if it had been the case that ring spindles were installed in new mills or in extensions of
old mills, then we would expect rms to install a large number of spindles. If, instead, rings were
being slowly adopted to replace retired mules, then we would observe much more variation in the
number of spindles. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the number of ring spindles installed in
35His claim that ring-frames were installed in extensions of old mills would be extremely hard to test because one
would have to collect information on the size of each rms mills. It is not even clear how Lazonick can make that
statement in the rst place, since he did not employ the rm-level information in Worralls Directories in conjunction
with some other data source providing information on the size of the mills, such as the Ordnance Surveys.
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1910.36 It is clear that there was a very large number of small installations (one quarter of them for
fewer than 8200 spindles), which is hard to reconcile with the idea that they were adopted by new
rms, and instead suggests that rms were slowly replacing the old mules with new ring spindles.
4.3 The Adoption of Rings for Weft Yarn: Integrated versus Non-integrated
Firms
The last of Lazonicks arguments is that the costs of shipping ring weft yarn were enormously larger
for a non-integrated rm than for an integrated rm. This made vertical integration even more
economically e¢ cient than specialization. To support this hypothesis, Lazonick claimed that prior
to World War I ring frames were rarely used for spinning weft yarns in non-integrated mills.37
Earlier writers have assumed that vertically integrated rms produced both twist and weft
yarn. This was not necessarily true, as shown in Table 6. The top panel of Table 6 shows the
distribution of rms in the production of twist and weft yarn. We observe that both in 1890 and
in 1910, approximately 70 percent of the vertically integrated rms were spinning both types. The
remaining vertically integrated rms had to buy either weft or twist to weave their cloth. These
rms were buying weft yarn on the market. For example, the rms Thornber in Burnley, Nuttal in
Farnsworth, Barker in Todmorden, and others had adopted rings to produce twist yarn. They were
buying the weft yarn for their weaving production (or they were selling their surplus of twist yarn
on the market). As already noted, not many of the vertically integrated rms were buying weft yarn
(or selling twist yarn), but it is notable that few of these had actually adopted rings. This surprising
result is even stronger for spinner-only rms. Only around 60 percent of them were spinning both
36Figure 3 includes only those rms for which we denitively know the number of ring spindles installed between
1902 and 1910. More than 90 percent (201 out of 221) of the rms that reported that they had installed rings in
1910 provided the exact number of ring spindles that they had installed.
37Lazonick [1981], page 98.
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twist and weft. What is particularly cogent for the analysis here is that the percentages did not
change between 1890 and 1910. This necessarily implies that vertically integrated rms did not
feel that is was necessary to produce both weft and twist in order to avoid the presumed cost of
shipping ring weft yarn.
The middle panel reports the results using spindleage capacity rather than the number of rms.
Here, the results are less dramatic. In 1890 and 1910, approximately 90 percent of the spindling
capacity of vertically integrated rms was in rms that were spinning both weft and twist yarn.
The results in the top and middle panel imply that large integrated rms generally produced both
types of yarn. Some small vertically integrated rms produced only one of the two.
The bottom panel reports the distribution of the spindling capacity by the neness of the
cloth woven and by whether twist and weft spinning were done together. We observe that the
percentages in this bottom panel basically follow the ones in the middle panel. For example, in
1890, 85:4 percent of the total spindleage capacity of the vertically integrated rms was used in
the production of coarse goods (count 0   40) by rms that were spinning both twist and weft.
70 percent of the total spindleage capacity of the spinner-only rms was used in the production of
coarse goods (count 0   40) by rms that were spinning both twist and weft. These percentages
were largely unchanged in 1910.
There are two key insights from Table 6. First, vertically integrated rms that were only
spinning twist or weft yarn were still in existence in 1910. If the costs of shipping ring weft yarn
were, in practice, as large as calculated by Lazonick and Leunig, then this sub-type of vertically
integrated rms should have declined over time, but it did not. Second, the shares of spindleage
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capacity and the number of rms that were vertically integrated and spinner-only rms did not
change over time. If vertical integration was really the more e¢ cient way to organize cotton
production, we would have observed a decline in the number and spindleage capacity of spinner-
only rms, but that did not happen.
4.4 Producing Finer Goods
To conclude this section on a positive note, I now use the new rm-level data to provide additional
evidence in favor of Leunigs explanation for Lancashires continuing preference for the mule: the
strong demand for ne yarn and the sizeable yarn-export trade.
Table 7 shows the distribution of the spindleage capacity by cloth neness and by the orga-
nization of the rms. In 1890, 75:6 percent of the spindleage capacity of the vertically integrated
rms was for the production of coarse goods (counts between 0 and 40).38 Among the spinner-only
rms, 53:4 percent of the spindleage capacity was for the production of coarse goods.
The striking piece of evidence is that between 1890 and 1910 there was a dramatic decline in the
percentage of spindleage dedicated to the production of coarse goods. In 1910, only 36:8 percent
of the spindleage capacity of the spinner-only rms was used to produce coarse goods, down from
53:4 percent. Similarly, 64:9 percent of the spindleage capacity of the vertically integrated rms
was used to produce coarse goods, down from 75:6 percent.
Table 7 provides evidence of a highly specialized industry. Spinner-only rms specialized in the
production of ne goods, while vertically integrated rms specialized in the production of coarse
goods. Because the spindleage capacity of spinner-only rms was twice as large as that of vertically
38This number is remarkably close to the one reported by Leunig [2001].
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integrated rms, and because ring spinning was not the most e¢ cient way to produce ne goods,
this largely explains why rings were adopted so slowly in Britain at the end of the 18th century.
5 Why Did Integrated Adopted Rings So Late?
A striking and novel nding is that very few vertically integrated rms had adopted any ring
spinning until 1902, and then suddenly they started adopting the rings at a faster pace than
spinning-only rms. This is clear when we look at Table 5. Until 1902, the large majority (87 out
of 109, approximately 80 percent) of the rms adopting rings were spinner-only rms. By 1910,
the percentage of rms that were spinner-only was down to 59 percent (197 out of 330). Why did
vertically integrated rms suddenly start adopting rings?
One very compelling explanation is related to the timing of the introduction of the Northrop
automatic loom in Britain. As Sandberg [1974] discusses, the Northrop loom was rst introduced
in 1902, and in 1904 the British Northrop Loom Company was established. This loom was not
suited to ne goods, which, as we saw, were mainly produced by spinner-only rms. However, the
Northrop loom was particularly e¢ cient in the production of coarse goods, which was the segment
of the market mostly covered by vertically integrated rms. Thus, vertically integrated rms should
have been adopting the new automatic loom, but, as Sandberg reports, they did so at a dramatically
slow rate. Remarkably, in Worralls Directory of 1910 there is one new vertically integrated rm,
Eccles Spinning & Manufacturing Co, formed in 1905 and located in Patricroft, Manchester, which
simultaneously adopted rings and Northrop looms.
The crucial insight here is that automatic looms required the greater strength of ring-spun as
opposed to mule-spun yarn (Sandberg [1974]). As Sandberg explains, the complementarity between
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ring spinning and automatic weaving meant that plans to install automatic looms depended on the
availability of ring spinning.
Vertically integrated rms, which mainly produced coarse goods and whose survival was clearly
at stake against foreign competitors, must have realized that they had to adopt rings in order
to exploit the advantages of the automatic looms. This intepretation explains the sudden and
dramatic increase in the rate of adoption of rings after 1902.39
6 Conclusion
This paper uses rm-level data to show that entrepreneurial failure does not explain the decline of
the Lancashire cotton industry before World War I, at least as long as the test for entrepreneurial
failure is based on di¤erences in the adoption of rings between vertically integrated and non-
integrated rms.
This paper shows that the Lancashire cotton industry was highly specialized, with vertically
integrated rms producing primarily coarse goods and spinner-only rms producing primarily yarn
for ne goods. This, together with the fact that the spindleage capacity of spinning-only rms was
twice as large as that of vertically integrated rms and the strong demand for ne yarn and the
sizeable yarn-export trade, explains Lancashires continuing preference for the mule.
This paper also uncovers a new important nding: very few vertically integrated rms had
adopted ring-spinning to any extent until 1902, and then suddenly they started adopting the rings
at a faster pace than only-spinning rms. Though more research is warranted to explain this
39To support this explanation, one could check the cotton company reports or trade journals and verify whether
the sudden change in the behavior of vertically integrated rms was driven by the awareness that only with both
automatic looms and ring spinning could the producers of coarse goods have survived the international competition.
This is left to future research.
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nding, here I propose an explanation based on the complementarity between ring spinning and
automatic weaving. Vertically integrated rms had to adopt ring spinning before adopting the
automatic looms. This intuitive explanation elucidates why rings were adopted so late by vertically
integrated rms, and why automatic looms were adopted so slowly by British entrepreneurs.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Data Coding Choices
The data are from Worralls The Cotton Spinners and ManufacturersDirectory for 1885, 1886-7,
1890, 1893-4, 1902 and 1910. These data contain information on the names of the rms, locations,
and types of spindles used by cotton rms in Lancashire. They also contain information on the
number of spindles (and looms) used by each rm, the neness of the product manufactured, and
whether the rm spun twist, weft, or both. Farnie [1979] discusses the reliability of Worralls
Directories.
This Appendix discusses three data coding choices.
Firms and Mills. In a few cases mills changed ownership across the years. In those cases, with
one exception (Ellis Meanock in Mossley, discussed below) I used the mill as the relevant unit of
observation. For example, if the rm Tay in Oldham acquired a mill that was already in existence
and placed rings in that pre-existing mill, then I coded the rm Tay as an incumbent and not as
a new entrant adopting rings. A di¤erent coding choice would have only a marginal e¤ect on the
results of this paper, because few mills changed ownership and adopted rings at the same time. In
1902 there were 7 rms out of 51, or 13 percent of the rms, which t this description. There were
only a handful in 1910, by which time more than 200 rms had adopted rings.
Potential for Misreporting. Firms are listed in Table 4a, 4b, and 4c as having adopted rings
when they rst reported rings in Worralls Directories. This is not an obvious data coding decision
because in some cases there is reason to believe that rms might have adopted rings before the
listed year. For example, the rm Palm Mill in Oldham reported 40; 000 ring spindles in 1887 and
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40; 000 (type not specied) spindles in 1885. One might be tempted to infer that the rm Palm
Mill had adopted rings already in 1885. In this paper I have decided not to make this type of
assumptions and instead I have coded the data exactly as it is in Worralls Directories. To get a
sense of the possible misreprentation problem, I identied 46 rms out of the 330 (i.e. 13 percent
of the sample) that had adopted rings by 1910 and for which one could possibly argue that the
rms had adopted rings earlier than what is reported in Worralls Directories.
These rms are Walker in Hyde, Victoria in Manchester, Lees in Oldham, Arkwright in Rochdale,
Healey in Rochdale, Glodwick in Oldham, Lees in Oldham, Mutual in Heywood, Roach in Heywood,
Irk Mill in Middleton, Wood in Middleton, James Stott in Oldham, Park Lane in Preston, Halliday
in Wigan, Eli Dyson in Farnsworth, Hodgkinsons in Heywood, Isherwood in Heywood, Railway
in Heywood, Roe Acre in Heywood, Storey in Lancaster, Broadbent in Manchester, Richardson
in Manchester, Millbrook in Stalybridge, Staley in Stalybridge, Shepherd in Waterfoot, Witham
in Burnley, Bury & Elton in Bury, Holdsworth in Manchester, Clegg in Oldham, Tattersall in
Rochdale, Heginbottom in Ashton, Richard Thompson in Blackburn, Trafalgar in Burnley, Bury
Co-operative Manufacturing Co. in Bury, Wood in Glossop, Sefton Mill in Heywood, Burton in
Leigh, Armitage in Manchester, Rylands in Manchester, Eccles in Preston, Broadley in Rochdale,
Harrison in Stalybridge, Pearson in Stockport, Barker in Todmorden, Fielden in Todmorden, and
Eckersleys in Wigan.
The only rms for which I use an imputation methodology are Haugh in Rochdale and Ellis
Meanock in Mossley, which I list as new entrants in 1887, even though they were already in the
market in 1885. The point here is that both of these rms entered into the market when they
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installed rings, so for the purposes of my analysis (Table 4.a) they should really be considered as
new entrants. Notice that Ellis Meanock used a pre-existing mill, but I still consider it as a new
entrant. It is the only case in the dataset for which I make this choice.
Of these 46 rms, 26 (i.e. 54 percent) were spinner-only. Because the fraction of rms potentially
misreporting is small (approximately 10 percent), and because both spinner-only and vertically
integrated rms are included in this group, there is no reason to think that misreporting should
bias the results of the analysis against vertically integrated rms.
Inconsistencies in Worralls The Cotton Spinners and ManufacturersDirectories. For
1902 and 1910 Worralls The Cotton Spinners and ManufacturersDirectories provide information
on the count of the yarn spun by the rms and on the type of spindle used whether ring, water,
or mule in two locations. First, as part of the complete rm listing, together with the information
on the number of spindles and the names of the mills owned. Second, at the end of the Directories,
where there is an alphabetical list of the rms in Lancashire. These two sources of information are
not always consistent with each other. Here, I take the superset of the two sets of information. In
other words, if a rm is reported as having adopted rings in either one of the locations then I code
the rm as having adopted rings.
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